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Abstract
In four studies, the authors investigated the individual-oriented versus social-oriented nature 
of procedural justice effects by comparing fairness-based responses to decision-making 
procedures among proself versus prosocial oriented individuals. In Studies 1 through 3, we 
measured participants’ social value orientation and manipulated whether or not they were 
granted or denied voice in a decision-making process. Results consistently revealed that the 
effects of voice versus no-voice on fairness-based perceptions, emotions, and behavioral 
intentions were significantly more pronounced for individuals with proself orientations than 
for individuals with prosocial orientations. These findings were extended in Study 4, a field 
study in which perceived procedural justice was a stronger predictor of satisfaction and 
organizational citizenship behaviors among proselfs than among prosocials. These findings 
suggest that procedural justice effects can be accounted for by self-oriented motives or needs, 
rather than prosocial motives that are often conceptualized as being associated with justice. 
Keywords: Procedural justice, social value orientation, social decision making, egocentrism
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The Egocentric Nature of Procedural Justice:
Social Value Orientation as Moderator of Reactions to Decision-Making Procedures
People care deeply about justice. This is evidenced by people’s strong reactions to 
social situations that they perceive to be fair or unfair: People tend to display great 
appreciation when they have the feeling that “justice was done”, but when people believe that 
injustice has prevailed they display aversive reactions such as anger, fear, and disgust (Lind & 
Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). One justice concern that people have pertains to outcome 
distributions: People want to receive fair outcomes (e.g., in proportion to the work they have 
conducted and/or in comparison to other people). This justice conceptualization is commonly 
referred to as distributive justice (Adams, 1965; Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978). A 
related but different justice concern that people have pertains to the procedures that are used 
for reaching decisions: People want authorities to use fair decision-making procedures. This 
justice conceptualization is commonly referred to as procedural justice (Thibaut & Walker, 
1975; for overviews, see Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; Lind & 
Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Blader, 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002). The 
distinction between distributive and procedural justice is important, because classic work of 
Thibaut and Walker (1975) suggests that people’s justice concerns indeed involve questions 
about both outcomes and procedures (see also Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996).
Both distributive and procedural justice have been studied extensively by social 
psychologists who examined social influences on people’s justice evaluations (Cropanzano, 
Byrne, Bobocel, & Rupp, 2001; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Van den Bos & 
Lind, 2002). However, relatively little research attention has been devoted to personality 
variables that predict people’s justice judgments (Colquitt, Scott, Judge, & Shaw, 2006). In 
the case of distributive justice, an exception to this observation can be made for social value 
orientation, defined as preferences for particular distributions of outcomes for self and others 
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(Messick & McClintock, 1968; Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997). Generally, a 
three-category typology of social value orientation is advanced, distinguishing among 
prosocial, individualistic, and competitive orientations. Prosocials are defined in terms of 
enhancing collective outcomes and equality in outcomes between themselves and others; 
individualists are defined in terms of enhancing outcomes for self with no or very little regard 
for other’s outcomes; and competitors are defined in terms of enhancing relative advantage 
over others. Thus, the distinction between social value orientations is multidimensional, and 
research indeed revealed that a prosocial orientation is associated with greater tendencies to 
enhance both collective outcomes and equality in outcomes than individualistic and 
competitive orientations (Van Lange, 1999). Furthermore, individualistic and competitive 
orientations are often combined into a single category of proself orientation, because both 
seek to enhance own outcomes, either in an absolute sense (individualists) or in a relative or 
comparative sense (competitors) (e.g., De Cremer & Van Lange, 2001; Parks, 1994; 
Smeesters, Warlop, Van Avermaet, Corneille, & Yzerbyt, 2003).
Past research has revealed that relative to proselfs, prosocials exhibit greater 
cooperation toward others, expect greater cooperation from others, and tend to interpret 
others’ behavior more strongly in terms of morality and fairness (e.g., Beggan, Messick, & 
Allison, 1988; De Dreu & Boles, 1998; Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken, & Suhre, 1986; McClintock 
& Liebrand, 1988; Smeesters et al., 2003; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). Also, prosocials are 
more likely to exhibit reciprocity and concern with fairness in outcome distributions, whereas 
proselfs to a larger extent try to benefit from the cooperation actually displayed by others or 
expected from others (Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975; Van Lange, 1999). Complementary 
research on response latencies, priming, emotion, and judgment underscores these findings in 
dyads and larger groups (e.g., Dehue, McClintock, & Liebrand, 1993; Stouten, De Cremer, & 
Van Dijk, 2005; Van Dijk, De Cremer, & Handgraaf, 2004).
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While past research on social value orientation has yielded a wealth of findings, it is 
important to note that virtually all research has focused on the manner in which prosocials and 
proselfs approach others, judge others, and respond to others when faced with situations that 
involve questions about distributive justice, that is, situations in which behavior directly 
shapes the--often tangible--outcomes for themselves and others. As a strong case in point, the
relation between social value orientation and procedural justice has been unexplored. Given 
that empirical research indicated that distributive and procedural justice are distinct types of 
justice judgments (for overviews, see Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Colquitt, 2001; Thibaut 
& Walker, 1975), scientific knowledge on the relation between social value orientation and 
justice may be extended substantially by examining how proselfs and prosocials differ in their 
responses to experiences of procedural justice. By investigating how social value orientation 
predicts people’s responses when they are subjected to procedurally fair versus unfair 
decision-making procedures (i.e., procedural justice effects), the present research has the 
major purpose to increase scientists’ understanding of people’s reactions to decision-making 
procedures in at least two important ways. 
First, examining the relation between social value orientation and experiences of 
procedural justice illuminates the egocentric versus prosocial nature of procedural justice 
phenomena. Specifically, using variations of a paradigm that is commonly used in the 
procedural justice literature, we study whether procedural justice effects are stronger -- or less 
strong -- for individuals with proself orientations (who primarily value outcomes for self) than 
for individuals with prosocial orientation (who value outcomes for self and others as well as 
equality in outcomes). If fairness-based responses to decision-making procedures are 
primarily inspired by self-oriented motives, then these responses should be especially 
pronounced for individuals with a proself orientation. Conversely, if fairness-based responses 
to decision-making procedures are primarily inspired by moral principles that dictate a 
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concern for both self and others, then these responses should be especially pronounced for 
individuals with a prosocial orientation. As such, the present research seeks to contribute to 
existing theories of justice and social decision making by illuminating the motivational basis 
for procedural justice effects.   
Second, the present research may help bridge the gap between procedural justice and 
personality differences in understanding why some people may be more sensitive and 
responsive to variations in procedural justice than others (cf. Colquitt et al., 2006). As noted 
earlier, social value orientation is predictive of cognitions, affect, behavior and interactions in 
social dilemma tasks and related outcome-relevant situations. As such, investigating how 
social value orientation predicts people’s reactions to decision-making procedures would 
provide insights into how individuals can be predisposed to respond to procedural justice or 
injustice in certain ways. These considerations led us to conduct a series of studies in which 
we explored how prosocials and proselfs differ in their reactions to decision-making 
procedures. In the following, we introduce the specifics of the current research and present 
our hypotheses.
Procedural Justice and Social Value Orientation
One of the most typical procedural justice phenomena is the finding that people are 
influenced substantially by the extent to which they regard the decision-making procedures 
that they are subjected to as fair or unfair: Decision-making procedures that are regarded as 
fair exert a positive influence on numerous perceptions, emotions, and behaviors when 
compared with decision-making procedures that are regarded as unfair (Leventhal, 1980; 
Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Tyler & Lind, 1992). An illustration of these procedural justice 
effects can be found in the effects of voice procedures: People evaluate decision-making 
procedures that allow them an opportunity to voice an opinion as more fair than procedures 
that deny them such an opportunity (Folger, 1977; Folger, Rosenfield, Grove, & Corkran, 
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1979). As a consequence, voice procedures (as opposed to no-voice procedures) increase 
people’s satisfaction ratings, decrease negative affect, lead people to evaluate their relation 
with decision-makers more positively, increase people’s willingness to accept decisions, 
decrease people’s intentions to take revenge, and increase their effort on behalf of the 
decision-making authority (e.g., Brockner, Heuer, Siegel, Wiesenfeld, Martin, & Grover, 
1998; Greenberg & Folger, 1983; Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Van den 
Bos, 2001, 2003; Van den Bos, Wilke, & Lind, 1998; Van Prooijen, Van den Bos, & Wilke, 
2004, 2005; Van Prooijen, Karremans, & Van Beest, 2006). In the current research, we refer 
to perceptions, emotions, and behaviors that are commonly assessed in procedural justice 
research and that tend to be related to perceived procedural justice as people’s fairness-based 
responses. The positive effects of voice as opposed to no-voice procedures on people’s 
fairness-based responses are very robust findings that replicate across a variety of 
methodologies and samples (Brockner et al., 1998; Lind et al., 1990; Tyler, 1987; Van den 
Bos & Van Prooijen, 2001).  
Decision-making procedures (such as voice or no-voice procedures) constitute actions 
on part of decision-making authorities that have direct implications for the well-being of 
recipients (Tyler & Lind, 1992; see also Koper, Van Knippenberg, Bouhuijs, Vermunt, & 
Wilke, 1993). As such, explanations of procedural justice effects have largely focused on the 
beneficial versus detrimental consequences of decision-making procedures for the self (Van 
Prooijen, Karremans, & Van Beest, 2006). Explanations of procedural justice effects can 
broadly be categorized into two classes: instrumental and non-instrumental explanations. 
Early instrumental explanations emphasized that people value procedures that allow them a 
certain amount of process control, that is, control over the manner in which decisions are 
taken (Thibaut & Walker, 1975). According to these instrumental explanations, people desire 
process control because it enables them to influence decisions, increasing the likelihood for 
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positive outcomes and decreasing the likelihood for negative outcomes. Thus, instrumental 
explanations proposed that fair procedures are functional to serve people’s instrumental desire 
for decisions that are beneficial to themselves.
In the mid-1980’s researchers suggested that people care about fairness in a decision-
making process for both instrumental and non-instrumental reasons (Lind et al., 1990; Tyler, 
Rasinski, & Spodick, 1985). These non-instrumental concerns are illuminated in one of the 
most influential explanations of procedural justice effects, the relational model of authority 
(Tyler & Lind, 1992; see also Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Blader, 2003). According to this 
model, people value fair procedures because it has positive implications for their sense of self-
worth. In particular, the model assumes that people have a need to be a respected member of 
their community (cf. Baumeister & Leary, 1995), and hence, they search for information 
about the extent to which they are valued and respected within their group. Because group 
authorities are regarded as representative for the entire group, the relational model argues, 
people make inferences about the extent to which they are respected members of their 
community from the way they are treated by group authorities. If an authority uses fair 
decision-making procedures, it communicates that the authority regards the recipient as 
having high status, respected, and as a fully-fledged member of the group. If an authority uses 
unfair decision-making procedures, it suggests that the authority regards the recipient as 
having low status or as a marginal or excluded member (Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996). 
Thus, non-instrumental explanations have suggested that fair decision-making procedures
serve an important value-expressive function that is beneficial to the self because it is 
associated with high status, respect, and satisfactory levels of belongingness (De Cremer, 
2002; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1994; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Van Prooijen et al., 2002, 2004, 
2005).
Although instrumental and non-instrumental explanations of procedural justice effects 
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differ conceptually, they converge on the assertion that people care about procedural justice
because of the positive self-relevant implications that fair decision-making procedures 
convey. As such, both classes of explanation assume that people desire procedural justice for 
egocentric reasons, and these egocentric reasons can be either instrumental (e.g., wanting 
positive outcomes) or non-instrumental (e.g., wanting to be respected, wanting to ensure a 
positive sense of self-worth) in nature. These considerations suggest that recipients’ fairness-
based responses to decision-making procedures are largely inspired by egocentric motivations 
(cf. Epley & Caruso, 2004; Lind et al., 1998; Messick & Sentis, 1979; Van Prooijen, Van den 
Bos, Lind, & Wilke, 2006). Based on this line of reasoning, it can be expected that fairness-
based responses of particularly proselfs (who are predisposed to be oriented towards 
benefiting themselves during allocation decisions) would be shaped by the specifics of the 
decision-making process. We therefore hypothesized that fairness-based responses would be 
more sensitive to decision-making procedures among proselfs than among prosocials. We
refer to this hypothesis as the egocentric justice hypothesis.
Moreover, we expected that both instrumental and non-instrumental concerns would 
contribute to this increased influence of procedures on fairness-based responses among 
proselfs. It might be argued that distinctions between proselfs and prosocials in responses to 
decision-making procedures are largely caused by instrumental motives. It has been found 
that procedures are to some extent used to gauge the fairness of expected outcomes (Thibaut 
& Walker, 1975; Van den Bos, Wilke, Lind, & Vermunt, 1998; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002), 
and it can plausibly be argued that this process is more pronounced among proself as opposed 
to prosocial individuals. Although such a finding would be innovative in itself, we argue here
that it is unlikely that instrumental motives alone can explain all variance in proselfs’ and 
prosocials’ differential responses to procedures. Even though social value orientation is 
measured by assessing individuals’ preferences for specific outcome distributions, it stands to 
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reason that these proself versus prosocial preferences reflect more general styles of processing 
social information in individually versus socially oriented ways. We therefore reasoned that it 
is likely that proself and prosocial orientations also have implications for self-relevant 
motives that are non-instrumental in nature. Hence, we expected that the egocentric justice 
hypothesis would materialize even after controlling for participants’ instrumental concerns.
Such an egocentric interpretation of procedural justice effects stands in contrast to the 
idea that people might desire fair decision-making procedures because of prosocial motives, 
like moral values and social norms (e.g., Folger, 1998). It may however well be the case that 
people desire fair decision-making procedures because of prosocial justice norms, such as
norms that all people should have a say in decisions that are relevant to them. This line of 
reasoning is not implausible, particularly given that prosocial justice norms also shape other 
forms of justice to a substantial extent. For instance, distributive justice findings indicate that 
many people seek equity or equality while evaluating overpayment as unfair (e.g., Adams, 
1965; Peters, Van den Bos, & Bobocel, 2004; Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978). 
Furthermore, fair decision-making procedures can potentially have prosocial implications, 
both instrumentally and non-instrumentally. To illustrate, fair decision-making procedures 
may lead to outcomes that are not only favorable to the self, but in addition, fair procedures 
may produce outcomes that are fair to all parties involved (Thibaut & Walker, 1975). 
Moreover, fair decision-making procedures are commonly associated with establishing and 
maintaining harmonious interpersonal relationships. This is evidenced, for instance, by 
findings that procedural justice stimulates cooperative behavior in social dilemmas (De 
Cremer & Tyler, 2005; Tyler & Degoey, 1995). These strivings for fair (and particularly 
equal) outcomes and harmonious interpersonal relationships reflect behavioral patterns that 
are commonly associated with prosocials, and less so with proselfs (De Cremer & Van Lange, 
2001; Eek & Gärling, 2006; Van Beest, Van Dijk, & Wilke, 2003; Van Lange, 1999). Based 
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on this line of reasoning, it might alternatively be expected that fairness-based responses of 
particularly prosocials (who are predisposed to strive for fairness and cooperative 
interpersonal behaviors) are shaped by the specifics of a decision-making process. It can thus 
alternatively be hypothesized that recipients’ fairness-based responses would be more 
sensitive to decision-making procedures among prosocials than among proselfs. We refer to 
this alternative hypothesis as the prosocial justice hypothesis.
In the current research, we conducted four studies in which we have put these 
competing hypotheses to the test in a variety of social settings, and on a wide range of justice-
based perceptions, emotions, and behavioral intentions. In all studies, we measured social 
value orientation as a personality variable using a validated decomposed games measure (Van 
Lange et al., 1997; Van Lange, 1999). Furthermore, Studies 1 through 3 were laboratory 
experiments in which we operationalized decision-making procedures by manipulating
whether or not participants were allowed or denied voice in a decision-making process. It has 
been noted that the positive effects of voice procedures on people’s fairness-based reactions is 
the most frequently replicated phenomenon in the procedural justice literature (Brockner et 
al., 1998; Lind et al., 1990; Tyler, 1987; Van den Bos & Van Prooijen, 2001), and as a 
consequence, procedural justice theories are to a substantial extent based on paradigms that 
investigated these decision-making procedures. Manipulating voice versus no-voice 
procedures therefore provides a good point of departure to investigate the relation between 
social value orientation and procedural justice. In Study 4 these experimental studies were 
extended with an applied study in which we measured as independent variables participants’ 
social value orientation and perceived procedural justice, and as dependent variables emotions
and behaviors that are commonly associated with justice. Furthermore, in Study 4 we 
controlled for perceptions of distributive justice to empirically establish whether the predicted 
findings indeed occur to some extent for non-instrumental reasons.
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Study 1
In Study 1, we tested our hypotheses by measuring social value orientation and 
manipulating voice versus no-voice procedures. The study focused on the most typical 
dependent variable in procedural justice research: Procedural justice judgments (e.g., Tyler & 
Lind, 1992; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002). In correspondence with previous research, we 
assessed procedural justice by focusing of the interpersonal component of the decision-
making process (e.g., Van den Bos, 2003; Van Prooijen, Karremans, & Van Beest, 2006):
Participants responded to the questions how fair, just, and appropriate they were treated by the 
decision-maker.1 Furthermore, given that justice judgments are closely associated with affect 
(Haidt, 2001; Van den Bos, 2003; Weiss, Suckow, & Cropanzano, 1999), in Study 1 we also 
tested our hypotheses on procedural satisfaction ratings. Based on the egocentric justice 
hypothesis, it can be expected that procedural justice judgments and procedural satisfaction 
ratings are more strongly influenced by the manipulation of voice versus no-voice procedures 
among proselfs than among prosocials. Based on the prosocial justice hypothesis, it can 
alternatively be expected that procedural justice judgments and procedural satisfaction ratings 
are more strongly influenced by the manipulation of voice versus no-voice procedures among 
prosocials than among proselfs.
Method
Participants and design. We tested our hypotheses in a design in which we measured 
participants’ social value orientations (prosocial versus proself), and randomly assigned 
participants to procedure conditions (voice versus no-voice). A total of 113 Leiden University 
students participated (42 males, 71 females; Mage = 19.99 years, SD = 2.51). The experiment 
was preceded by another experiment that was unrelated to the findings reported here. The 
experiments lasted one hour, and participants were paid 7 euros for participation.
Procedure. Participants were led to separate cubicles where they found computer 
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equipment to present the stimulus information and to register the data. The experiment was 
presented as two unrelated studies. Participants started with “Experiment 1”, in which we 
measured (as part of a larger questionnaire)2 social value orientations by means of the nine-
item Triple-Dominance Measure of Social Value Orientation (see Van Lange, Otten, de 
Bruin, & Joireman, 1997, for details). This measure, as well as related measures, has excellent 
psychometric qualities. It is internally consistent (e.g. Parks, 1994), reliable over substantial 
time periods (Eisenberger, Kuhlman, & Cotterell, 1992), is not related to measures of social 
desirability (e.g., Platow, 1994), predictive of motives and behaviors in the laboratory and the 
real world, and easy to administer in an experimental session or survey (e.g., for instructions, 
see Van Lange et al., 2007).  Each item in this measure contains three alternative outcome 
distributions with points for oneself and an (anonymous) other. The other is said to be 
someone that they did not know and that they would never knowingly meet in the future so as 
to examine participants' general tendencies toward others. The instructions briefly note that 
the other will be making choices so as to induce some interdependence between the 
participant and the other. Finally, outcomes are presented in terms of points, and participants 
were asked to imagine that the points had value to themselves as well as to the other person
Each outcome distribution represents a particular orientation. An example of one 
choice item is the following: Option A: 480 points for self and 80 points for other; Option B:  
540 points for self and 280 points for other; and Option C: 480 points for self and 480 points 
for other. In this example, option A represents the competitive choice, because it provides a 
larger difference between one's own and the other's outcome (480 - 80 = 400) than either 
option B (540 - 280 = 260) or option C (480 - 480 = 0). Option B represents the 
individualistic choice because one's own outcome is larger (540) than are those in option A 
(480) or option C (480). Finally, option C represents the prosocial choice, because it provides 
a larger joint outcome (480 + 480 = 960) than does either option A (480 + 80 = 560) or option 
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B (540 + 280 = 820); also, option C represents a smaller discrepancy between own and other's 
outcomes (480 - 480 = 0) than does either option A (480 - 80 = 400) or option B (540 - 280 = 
260). Hence, the prosocial choice represents both a concern for collective outcomes and a 
concern for equal outcomes, as past research has revealed that those consistently choosing the 
prosocial option tend to do so for both concerns (Van Lange, 1999). 
Participants are classified as prosocial, individualistic or competitive when at least six 
choices (out of nine) are consistent with one of the three orientations (e.g., Van Lange & 
Kuhlman, 1994).  It turned out that 40 participants were classifiable as prosocial, 41 as 
individualist, and 17 as competitor. A total of 15 participants were not classifiable and were 
excluded from further analyses. In correspondence with previous research, and because both 
individualists and competitors have an egocentric focus in their outcome choices, the 
individualists and competitors were combined to form one group of proselfs3 (e.g., De Cremer & 
Van Lange, 2001; Parks, 1994; Smeesters et al., 2003).
Participants then continued with “Experiment 2”, which was ostensibly unrelated to 
Experiment 1. Experiment 2 was introduced as an experiment on how people perform tasks. 
Participants were led to believe that all computers in the lab were interconnected, and that the 
experimenter, who was supposed to be in one of the cubicles, could send messages to all 
participants during the experiment (in reality, all stimulus information was pre-programmed; a 
procedure none of the participants commented on during the debriefing). Finally, participants 
were informed that a lottery with a prize of 50 euros would take place among all participants, 
and that following the tasks the experimenter would allocate a number of lottery tickets to the 
participant (e.g., Van den Bos, 2001, 2003; Van den Bos et al., 1998; Van Prooijen et al., 
2002, 2004; Van Prooijen, Karremans, & Van Beest, 2006). 
Next, the tasks were explained to the participants. Figures would be presented on the 
upper right side of the computer screen. Each figure consisted of 36 squares, and each square 
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showed one of eight distinct patterns. One of these patterns was presented at the upper left 
side of the computer screen, and participants had to count the number of squares with this 
pattern in the figure on the right side of the screen. After participants had indicated the correct 
number, a new figure was presented. Participants completed 25 of these figures. 
Following the tasks, the manipulation of procedure was administered to the 
participants. Participants in the voice condition were informed that they were allowed an 
opportunity to voice their opinion about the number of lottery tickets that they thought should 
be allocated to them. These participants were asked to type in the number of lottery tickets 
they thought they should receive. Participants in the no-voice condition were informed that 
they were not allowed an opportunity to voice their opinion about the number of lottery 
tickets that they thought should be allocated to them. These participants were not asked to 
type in the number of lottery tickets they thought they should receive. Participants were then 
informed that they would be asked a number of questions before being informed about the 
number of lottery tickets they would receive. These questions, each being presented on a 
separate screen, constituted the dependent measures and the manipulation checks.
To measure participants’ procedural justice judgments, we posed the following three 
questions: “How fair was the way you were treated by the experimenter?” (1 = very unfair, 7 
= very fair), “How just was the way you were treated by the experimenter?” (1 = very unjust, 
7 = very just), and “How appropriate was the way you were treated by the experimenter?” (1 
= very inappropriate, 7 = very appropriate). These three items were averaged into a reliable 
procedural justice scale (α = .92). To measure procedural satisfaction, we asked the following 
two questions: “How satisfied are you with the way you were treated by the experimenter?” (1 
= very unsatisfied, 7 = very satisfied), and “How glad are you with the way you were treated 
by the experimenter?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). These two items were averaged into a 
reliable procedural satisfaction scale (α = .89). Although the procedural justice and 
 
 
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
The egocentric nature 16
satisfaction scales were strongly correlated (r = .74,  p < .001), we decided to analyze them as 
separate variables, given theoretical arguments that justice judgments and satisfaction ratings 
not necessarily originate from the same psychological process (Van den Bos, Wilke, Lind, & 
Vermunt, 1998). To check the procedure manipulation, we asked the following two questions 
(not at all, 7 = very much): “To what extent did the experimenter allow you an opportunity to 
voice your opinion about the number of lottery tickets that should be allocated to you?” and 
“How much attention did the experimenter have for your opinion about the number of lottery 
tickets that should be allocated to you?”. These two items were averaged into a reliable 
procedure check scale (α = .77). After this, participants were debriefed, thanked, and paid for 
their participation. 
Results
Manipulation check. A 2 (SVO) x 2 (procedure) ANOVA on the procedure check 
scale yielded a significant procedure main effect only, F(1, 94) = 87.16, p < .001. Participants 
in the voice condition perceived more opportunities to voice their opinions (M = 4.84, SD = 
1.20) than participants in the no-voice condition (M = 2.18, SD = 1.51). These results indicate
that participants perceived the procedure manipulation as intended.
Voiced opinions. We analyzed whether social value orientation predicted participants’ 
expressed opinions in the voice condition as to how many lottery tickets they believe should 
be allocated to them. Results revealed that the effect of social value orientation was 
nonsignificant, F (1, 44) = 3.44, p < .08, although we do note a trend towards proselfs asking 
for more lottery tickets (M = 29.30, SD = 57.04) than prosocials (M = 4.84, SD = 6.06). In 
Study 2, we test whether this nonsignificant trend on participants’ voiced opinions is reliable. 
For now, we note that when we included participants’ voiced opinions as a covariate in the 
analysis testing the simple effect of social value orientation on the dependent variables in the 
voice condition, results were similar as reported below. This suggests that the present results 
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can not be attributed to people’s instrumental desire to acquire a satisfactory number of lottery 
tickets.  
Dependent variables. The means and standard deviations are displayed in Table 1. To 
analyze procedural justice judgments and procedural satisfaction ratings, we conducted a 2
(SVO) x 2 (procedure) MANOVA. This analysis yielded a significant multivariate procedure 
main effect, F(2, 93) = 6.96, p < .01, which was qualified by a significant multivariate 
interaction, F(2, 93) = 4.11, p < .03. On the univariate level, the interaction was significant for 
both procedural justice judgments, F(1, 94) = 7.69, p < .01, and for procedural satisfaction 
ratings, F(1, 94) = 6.23, p < .02. 
The means in Table 1 suggest that particularly proselfs responded strongly to the 
granting versus the denial of voice opportunities. We conducted simple main effect analyses 
to directly test the relative strength of the voice effect among prosocials and proselfs. On both 
dependent variables, the procedure simple main effect was significant among proselfs, for 
procedural justice judgments, F(1, 94) = 15.88, p < .001; for procedural satisfaction ratings, 
F(1, 94) = 23.50, p < .001. However, the procedure simple main effect was nonsignificant 
among prosocials, both Fs < 1. These results supported the egocentric justice hypothesis, that 
is, that particularly proselfs respond strongly to whether or not they receive voice 
opportunities in a decision-making process. 
It can further be noted here that the effect of social value orientations was significant 
in the voice condition, for procedural justice judgments, F(1, 94) = 8.75, p < .01; and for 
procedural satisfaction ratings, F(1, 94) = 7.01, p < .02. Furthermore, in the no-voice 
condition, the effect of social value orientation approached significance on both measures, for 
procedural justice judgments, F(1, 94) = 2.77, p < .10; for procedural satisfaction ratings, F(1, 
94) = 3.77, p < .06. These results indicate that, in Study 1, social value orientation has the 
potential to influence fairness-based responses to both voice and no-voice procedures.
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Discussion
The results of Study 1 provided preliminary support for the egocentric justice 
hypothesis: Particularly proselfs are sensitive to whether or not they receive voice 
opportunities. In fact, in the current experiment the procedure manipulation exerted very 
strong effects among proselfs and nonsignificant effects among prosocials on both procedural 
justice judgments and procedural satisfaction ratings. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that social 
value orientation influenced responses to both voice and no-voice procedures in Study 1. 
These findings suggest that social value orientation has the potential to influence both positive 
responses to voice and negative responses to no-voice.
By focusing on procedural justice judgments and satisfaction ratings, the current 
findings suggest that social value orientation predicts the influence of decision-making 
procedures on justice judgments and emotions. In Study 2, we sought to replicate and extend 
these findings. In particular, we sought to replicate the findings on procedural justice and 
satisfaction ratings, while simultaneously investigating the effects on other justice-based 
perceptions and emotions: Participants’ perception of their relation with authorities (i.e., 
relational treatment evaluations), their negative affective reactions, and their willingness to 
accept decisions (Tyler & Lind, 1992). As such, Study 2 was designed to assess the extent to 
which the present findings generalize to multiple types of fairness-based responses.
Study 2
Method
Participants and design. As in Study 1, we tested the hypotheses in a design in which 
we measured social value orientations and randomly assigned participants to procedure 
conditions (voice versus no-voice). A total of 90 participants were recruited in the student 
cafeterias of the Free University Amsterdam (Mage = 21.23 years, SD = 3.73; 35 males, 55 
females). The experiment was preceded and followed by other studies that were unrelated to 
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the findings reported here. The studies lasted a total of 1 hour, and participants were paid 7 
euros for their participation.
Procedure. The experimental procedure was very similar to Study 1. Again, we 
measured social value orientations in “Experiment 1”. It turned out that 32 participants were 
classified as prosocial, 45 as individualist, and 5 as competitor. A total of 8 participants could 
not be classified and were excluded from further analyses. In correspondence with Study 1, 
we combined individualists and competitors into a general category of proselfs (e.g., 
Smeesters et al., 2003).
We again presented “Experiment 2” (which contained the procedure manipulation) as 
an unrelated study. The lottery ticket procedure was the same as in Study 1. Participants 
completed the same figures as Study 1, although we slightly adjusted the task contingencies: 
Participants were instructed to complete as many figures as possible within three minutes. 
Following these three minutes, participants were informed that their performance on the tasks 
(in comparison to other participants) was about average. The subsequent manipulation of 
voice versus no-voice procedures was the same as in Study 1. 
To measure perceived procedural justice, we asked the same three questions as in 
Study 1, and again averaged them into a reliable procedural justice scale (α = .93). To 
measure procedural satisfaction, we posed the same two questions as in Study 1, and averaged 
them into a reliable procedural satisfaction scale (α = .90). To measure negative procedural 
affect, we posed the following three questions: “How disappointed are you about the way you 
were treated by the experimenter? (1 = not very disappointed, 7 = very disappointed), “How 
angry are you about the way you were treated by the experimenter?” (1 = not very angry, 7 = 
very angry), and “How mad are you about the way you were treated by the experimenter?” (1 
= not very mad, 7 = very mad). These questions were averaged into a reliable negative 
procedural affect scale (α = .91). Furthermore, a factor analysis (oblimin rotation) indicated
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that the procedural satisfaction and negative procedural affect items loaded on separate 
factors, confirming that these indeed are theoretically distinct constructs. To measure 
participants’ relational treatment evaluations, we posed the following two questions (1 = not 
at all, 7 = very much): “Do you believe that the experimenter has faith in you?” and “Do you 
believe that the experimenter is proud of you?”. These two questions were averaged into a 
reliable relational treatment scale (α = .79). To measure participants’ willingness to accept the 
experimenter’s decisions, we asked the following two questions (1 = not at all, 7 = very 
much): “To what extent are you willing to comply to the experimenter’s decisions?” and “To 
what extent are you willing to accept the experimenter’s decisions?”. These two questions 
were averaged into a reliable decision acceptance scale (α = .93). The procedure manipulation 
was checked with the same two items as Study 1, and we again averaged these items into a 
reliable procedure check scale (α = .82). After this, the experiment ended, and participants 
were fully debriefed, thanked, and paid for their participation.   
Results
Manipulation check. A 2 (SVO) x 2 (procedure) ANOVA on the procedure check 
scale revealed a significant procedure main effect only, F(1, 78) = 132.05, p < .001. 
Participants in the voice conditions perceived more opportunities to voice their opinions (M = 
4.99, SD = 1.27) than participants in the no-voice condition (M = 1.84, SD = 1.09). Both the 
social value orientation main effect and the interaction were nonsignificant, Fs < 1. These 
results suggest that participants perceived the procedure manipulation as intended.
Voiced opinions. As in Study 1, we again analyzed the influence of social value 
orientation on participants’ expressed opinions in the voice condition. Results revealed that 
the effect of social value orientation was nonsignificant, F < 1 (overall M = 19.88, SD = 
49.90). This finding indicates that the nonsignificant trend that was observed in Study 1 on 
participants’ voiced opinions is not reliable, and suggests that the findings described below 
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are independent of participants’ desire for a satisfactory number of lottery tickets.
Dependent variables. The means and standard deviations are displayed in Table 2. All 
dependent variables were included in a 2 (SVO) x 2 (procedure) MANOVA. This analysis 
produced a multivariate procedure main effect, F(5, 74) = 7.92, p < .001. More important was 
that this analysis also revealed a significant multivariate interaction, F(5, 74) = 3.05, p < .02. 
Results revealed that the univariate interaction was significant for all dependent variables: For 
procedural justice judgments, F(1, 78) = 9.09, p < .01; for procedural satisfaction ratings, F(1, 
78) = 8.78, p < .01; for negative procedural affect, F(1, 78) = 6.58, p < .02; for relational 
treatment evaluations, F(1, 78) = 4.00, p < .05; and for decision acceptance, F(1, 78) = 5.15, p
< .03.
To explore these interactions, we conducted simple main effect analyses. Among 
proselfs, the procedure simple main effects was significant for all dependent variables: For 
procedural justice judgments, F(1, 78) = 12.94, p < .01; for procedural satisfaction ratings, 
F(1, 78) = 36.74, p < .001; for negative procedural affect, F(1, 78) = 13.19, p < .001; for 
relational treatment evaluations, F(1, 78) = 8.23, p < .01; and for decision acceptance, F(1, 
78) = 33.38, p < .001. Among prosocials, however, the procedure simple main effect was 
nonsignificant for all dependent variables: For procedural justice judgments, F < 1; for 
procedural satisfaction ratings, F(1, 78) = 1.47, ns.; for negative procedural affect, F < 1; for 
relational treatment evaluations, F < 1; and for decision acceptance, F(1, 78) = 2.80, p > .09. 
These results are in correspondence with Study 1 by showing that particularly proselfs are 
sensitive to voice versus no-voice procedures, thus corroborating the egocentric justice 
hypothesis.
It can further be noted here that, in the voice condition, the simple main effect of 
social value orientation was significant for negative procedural affect, F(1, 78) = 5.20, p < 
.03, and for decision acceptance, F(1, 78) = 6.30, p < .02, but it was nonsignificant for 
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procedural justice judgments, F(1, 78) = 1.52, ns., for procedural satisfaction ratings, F(1, 78) 
= 1.33, ns., and for relational treatment evaluations, F < 1. In the no-voice condition, 
however, the simple main effect of social value orientation was significant for all dependent 
variables: For procedural justice judgments, F(1, 78) = 13.04, p < .01; for procedural 
satisfaction ratings, F(1, 78) = 21.33, p < .001; for negative procedural affect, F(1, 78) = 4.57, 
p < .04; for relational treatment evaluations, F(1, 78) = 7.21, p < .01; and for decision 
acceptance, F(1, 78) = 6.04, p < .02. As in Study 1, these findings suggest that social value 
orientation has the potential to influence both positive responses to voice and negative 
responses to no-voice. It can be noted, however, that the effects of social value orientation on 
justice-based responses seem to be most robust for participants’ negative responses to no-
voice procedures. In the General Discussion, we return to this issue.
Discussion
Both Studies 1 and 2 indicate that manipulations of voice versus no-voice procedures 
influence procedural justice judgments and satisfaction ratings more strongly among proselfs 
than among prosocials. Furthermore, in Study 2 these findings were extended to other justice-
based perceptions and emotions, that is, relational treatment evaluations, negative affect, and 
participants’ willingness to accept decisions. These findings reveal that particularly recipients
who are predisposed to reason egocentrically (i.e., proselfs) are sensitive to variations in 
decision-making procedures, which is reflected on a wide range of fairness-based responses.
Study 3
Study 3 was designed to extend the previous studies in two ways. First, we 
investigated the egocentric versus prosocial justice hypotheses in a within-group setting. 
Procedural justice essentially is a social phenomenon, and hence, it has been argued that 
group memberships have a pivotal role in understanding procedural justice processes
(Cropanzano et al., 2001; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Blader, 
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2000; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Study 3 therefore sought to mimic everyday life situations where 
people are allowed or denied voice as part of a social group. Second, whereas Studies 1 and 2 
focused on the influence of social value orientation and decision-making procedures on 
justice-based perceptions and emotions, in Study 3 we investigated potential behavioral 
implications of these findings. It has been noted that people regard authorities as 
representative for the group, and hence, being treated unfairly by an authority may deteriorate 
recipients’ relation with the entire group (Tyler & Lind, 1992; De Cremer, 2002). As a 
consequence, unfair treatment may lead people to seek revenge towards the group, as the 
group is regarded as symbolic for the authority’s actions. We measured negative behavioral 
intentions that are detrimental to group functioning by focusing on the explosion component 
of revenge responses (i.e., putting effort and energy into behavioral actions; Tripp & Bies, 
1997). In particular, we asked participants to what extent they wanted to “take revenge”, 
“cross the group plans”, and “counteract the group task”. These revenge intentions reflect a 
recent trend in justice research to focus on the retaliatory consequences of unfair treatment 
(Skitka & Crosby, 2003; cf. Darley & Pittman, 2003). According to the egocentric justice 
hypothesis, no-voice procedures should stimulate these retaliatory anti-group behaviors 
particularly among proselfs. According to the prosocial justice hypothesis, however, no-voice 
procedures should stimulate these retaliatory anti-group behaviors particularly among 
prosocials.
Method
Participants and design. The hypotheses were again tested in a design in which we 
measured social value orientations and randomly assigned participants to procedure 
conditions (voice versus no-voice). One hundred and seventeen undergraduate students from 
Tilburg University (77 females and 40 males; Mage  = 19.81 years, SD = 2.00) participated in 
exchange for course credit. 
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Procedure. Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were placed in an experimental 
cubicle containing a table, a chair, and a computer. Participants were led to believe that all 
interactions and communications would take place via the computer (which was believed to 
be connected to a general server). It was said that every participant would receive an 
experimental number. 
As a supposedly first task, participants were asked to help out in validating a new 
questionnaire. This questionnaire was the Decomposed Games measure, which was identical 
to Studies 1 and 2. It turned out that, out of 117 participants, 44 participants were identified as 
prosocials, 51 participants as individualists, and 10 participants as competitors. A total of 12 
participants could not be classified and were therefore excluded from further analyses.
Individualists and competitors were again combined into one category of proselfs.
After having completed the SVO-questionnaire, participants were told that the second 
experiment would take place in a group context. All participants were put together in a group 
and they were informed that during the first part of this study they would have to participate 
in several tasks. At that time it was already said that successful completion of these tasks 
would reveal additional financial bonuses. These bonuses would be useful in the second part 
of the study where participants would have to participate in individual tasks. In these 
individual tasks financial resources could then be used to, for example, buy additional task 
information or even buy out the task assignment from the experimenter.  
After this, participants were told that the tasks would start pretty soon, but that it first 
had to be decided how the financial resources (emerging from a successful completion of the 
tasks within the group) would be distributed in the group. It was then said that the 
experimenter would make a decision regarding the manner in which this allocation procedure 
should be implemented in the group. Then, the procedure manipulation was introduced. In the 
voice condition, participants received an email saying that their opinion would be asked with 
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respect to the allocation decision. Thus, they would be listened to, and participants 
subsequently were enabled to write an email message to the experimenter. In the no voice 
condition, the email said that their opinion would not be asked. Thus, they would not be 
listened to, and these participants were not enabled to write an email message to the 
experimenter. In correspondence with previous research, participants were not informed about 
the procedure their fellow group members were subjected to (Van den Bos et al., 1998; Van 
Prooijen et al., 2004, 2005).
Finally, the dependent measures were solicited. All questions were responded to on a 
7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much so). To assess the effectiveness of the voice 
manipulation, participants were asked to what extent they felt that they were listened to with 
respect to allocating the financial resources. Then, negative behavioral intentions were 
assessed by asking participants to what extent they wanted to “take revenge”, “cross the group 
plans “, and “counteract the group task”. These items were combined to form one average 
negative behavioral intentions scale ( = .93).  Finally, participants were debriefed, given 
their course credit and thanked.
Results
Manipulation check. A 2 (SVO) x 2 (procedure) ANOVA on the voice manipulation 
check question revealed only a significant main effect of procedure, F(1, 101) = 432.92, p < 
.001.  Participants in the voice condition reported that they were listened to more than those in 
the no voice condition (Ms = 5.78 vs. 1.35, SDs = 1.02 and 1.07; respectively).  No significant 
main effect of SVO or interaction effect was found, Fs < 1. These findings revealed that 
participants perceived the procedure manipulation as intended.
Negative behavioral intentions. A 2 (SVO) x 2 (procedure) ANOVA on the negative 
behavioral intentions scale revealed, first of all, a significant main effect of procedure, F(1, 
101) = 33.62, p < .001. More importantly, the results also revealed a significant interaction, 
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F(1, 101) = 4.70, p < .05. The means and standard deviations are displayed in Table 3. As 
predicted by the egocentric justice hypothesis, the procedure simple main effect was 
significantly stronger among proselfs, F(1, 101) = 39.13, p < .001, 2 = .28, than among 
prosocials, F(1, 101) = 5.54, p < .05, 2 = .05.
It can further be noted here that the effect of social value orientation was nonsignificant 
within the voice condition, F < 1. The effect of social value orientation was significant in the 
no-voice condition, however, F(1, 101) = 7.03, p < .01. Thus, social value orientation 
particularly influenced negative behavioral intentions when participants were denied voice 
opportunities. This is in correspondence with the assertion that these negative behaviors are 
associated with unfair treatment (Tripp & Bies, 1997), and provides further support for the 
notion observed in Study 2 that, on average, social value orientation particularly influences 
negative responses to no-voice procedures.
Discussion
Study 3 extended Studies 1 and 2 by indicating that social value orientation and 
decision-making procedures predict negative behavioral intentions, and by revealing that 
these effects emerge in an explicit within-group setting. These findings further suggest that 
the effects of granting versus denying voice opportunities are more pronounced among 
proselfs than among prosocials. Taken together, Studies 1 to 3 revealed that numerous justice-
based perceptions, emotions, and behavioral intentions are more sensitive to voice versus no-
voice procedures among proselfs than among prosocials, as predicted by the egocentric justice 
hypothesis.
Study 4
Studies 1 to 3 provided consistent support for the egocentric justice hypothesis. Study 
4 was designed to extend these studies in three meaningful ways. First, the results of Studies 1 
to 3 are limited to the effects of voice versus no-voice procedures. Although these variations 
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in decision-making procedures have a strong and robust influence on justice-based responses 
and are central to many procedural justice studies, there are more criteria that determine 
whether people judge procedures to be fair or unfair (Leventhal, 1980). In Study 4, we 
therefore focused on general perceptions of procedural justice instead of specific 
manipulations of voice versus no-voice. In particular, we measured the procedural justice 
scale that was validated by Colquitt (2001), which is based on a variety of Leventhal’s 
procedural justice criteria.
Second, the results of Studies 1 to 3 are limited to the psychological laboratory and to 
the specific population of university students. Although laboratory experiments are very well-
suited to investigate the causal influence of theoretical constructs on the dependent variables
while assuring high internal validity, one may question whether the processes observed in the 
laboratory generalize to situations outside of the laboratory and to different populations. For 
instance, Study 3 sought to investigate the egocentric versus prosocial justice hypotheses in a 
within-group setting, but to this end, the study focused on instantly created laboratory groups 
in which the members had no previous history or anticipation of future interaction. To get an 
indication of the generalizability of the present findings, we investigated whether further 
evidence for our conclusions could be obtained outside of the psychological laboratory. In 
Study 4 we therefore investigated the egocentric versus prosocial justice hypotheses in a
large-scale survey among a random sample of the Dutch working population. This population 
not only differs from university students, but also allows for a test of the egocentric justice 
hypothesis in a real-life intragroup setting with existing and ongoing interdependence 
structures between its members.
As a third extension, in Study 4 we conducted a more stringent test of the question
whether the predicted effects would hold after controlling for participants’ instrumental 
concerns. Studies 1 and 2 provided preliminary support for the idea that non-instrumental 
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concerns contribute to differences between proselfs and prosocials in procedural justice 
effects, given that the data revealed no differences between proselfs and prosocials in the 
opinions that they ventilated if they were allowed voice. To more completely exclude the 
possibility that instrumental motives alone can account for the described effects, we measured 
procedural justice as well as distributive justice in the context of salary decisions. We 
reasoned that in such an outcome-focused context a lot of variance in fairness-based responses 
to procedures could potentially be explained by people’s distributive justice concerns. Hence, 
we sought to investigate whether, even in such an instrumental setting, the egocentric justice 
hypothesis would materialize while controlling for distributive justice concerns. This would 
further strengthen our confidence that the relation between social value orientation and 
procedural justice can not be attributed to instrumental motives alone. To measure perceived 
distributive justice, we assessed the distributive justice scale that was identified by Colquitt 
(2001) as being distinct from, yet strongly correlated to, procedural justice. If also non-
instrumental concerns contribute to the difference between proselfs and prosocials in 
procedural justice effects, then the predicted effects should emerge even after controlling for 
these distributive justice concerns. Study 4 was thus designed to establish that the relation 
between social value orientation and procedural justice is empirically distinct from the 
relation between social value orientation and distributive justice.
Like in Study 1 and 2, we used our participants’ satisfaction as dependent measure. In 
addition, we also measured organizational citizenship behaviors (Moorman & Blakely, 1995). 
These are behaviors that rarely are described in employees’ formal job requirements but that 
are essential to healthy organizational functioning. As such, the measurement of 
organizational citizenship behaviors extends Study 3 (that focused on negative behaviors) by 
examining the implications of the egocentric justice hypothesis for positive behaviors. We 
predict the relations between procedural justice and the two dependent variables to be stronger 
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for proselfs than for prosocials.
Method
Sample and procedure. This study was part of a large study about leadership, power, 
and fairness. A total of 973 Dutch people who worked for at least eight hours a week and who 
had a supervisor were selected from the national postal guide. They were sent a letter in which 
they were asked to participate in “a study on work experience”, by filling out the enclosed 
questionnaire and returning it in the prepaid envelope. Participation would be completely 
anonymous. Of these 973 questionnaires, 16 were returned because the addressee no longer 
lived there, leaving 957 questionnaires that actually reached the intended respondents. A 
reminder was sent to all intended respondents two weeks after the first mailing.
A total of 359 questionnaires were returned (a response rate of 38%), with 65% of the 
participants being male and 35% being female (Mage = 42.71 years, SD = 10.26). Of the 
respondents, 2% had only lower education (primary school), 39% had followed up on this by 
secondary education only, 25% had followed up on their secondary education with vocational 
education, 23% had a bachelor, and 9% had a masters degree. Only 1% indicated that they 
had “another” education. Furthermore, 38% had a net month salary below € 1500, 35% earned 
between € 1500 and 2000, 14% earned between € 2000 and 2500, and 14% earned more than 
€ 2500. The respondents had worked, on average, for 11.94 years with their current 
organization (SD = 10.66) and for 8.49 years (SD = 9.93) in their current job. 
Questionnaire. To measure employees’ Social Value Orientation, we used the same 
nine-item Decomposed Game measure as in our previous studies. Out of a total number of 359 
individuals, 44 people could not be classified and were therefore excluded from further 
analyses. Of the 315 remaining individuals, 193 (61%) were identified as prosocials, 98 
(31%) as individualists, and 24 (8%) as competitors. In correspondence with the previous 
studies, individualists and competitors were combined to form one group of proselfs (n = 
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122).
All other items were answered on 5-point scales (1 = disagree, 5 = agree). Prior to 
assessing procedural and distributive justice, participants were informed that they would 
respond to a number of questions that pertained to their salaries and to the procedures used to 
determine their salaries. Perceived procedural justice was assessed with the 7-item procedural 
justice scale of Colquitt (2001), containing the procedural justice rules proposed by Leventhal 
(1980). The items were introduced with: “When your salary was determined, to what extent 
did you experience that….”; followed by, for example: “you were able to express your views 
and feelings?”; “the used procedures were applied consistently?”; and “the used procedures 
were based on accurate information?”. The items were averaged into a reliable procedural 
justice scale (α = .85).
To measure distributive justice, participants responded to the 4-item distributive 
justice scale of Colquitt (2001). This scale contains the following items: “Does your salary 
reflect what you have contributed to the organization?”, “Is your salary appropriate for the 
work you have completed?”, “Does your salary reflect the effect you have put into your 
work?”, and “Is your salary justified, given your performance?” These items were averaged 
into a reliable distributive justice scale ( = .95). 
Participant’s satisfaction was measured with the following two items: “In doing my 
job, I often feel satisfied.”, and “In doing my job I often feel positive.” These two items were 
averaged into a reliable satisfaction scale ( = .82). 
Participants’ Organizational Citizenship Behavior (OCB) was assessed with nine items 
taken from Moorman and Blakely (1995), including “I go out of my way to help co-workers 
with work-related problems”, “I frequently adjust my work schedule to accommodate other 
employees' requests for time-off”, “I always go out of my way to make newer employees feel 
welcome in the work group”, “I show genuine concern and courtesy toward co-workers, even 
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under the most trying business or personal situations”, “I frequently communicate to co-
workers suggestions on how the group can improve”, “I perform my duties with unusually 
few errors”, “I perform my job duties with extra-special care”, “I encourage friends and 
family to utilize organization products”, “I defend the organization when outsiders criticize 
it.” These nine items were averaged into a reliable OCB scale (α = .74).
Results
The means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations of perceived distributive justice, 
perceived procedural justice, and the two dependent variables (OCB and satisfaction) are 
displayed in Table 4. In correspondence with previous research, distributive and procedural 
justice were substantially correlated (Colquitt, 2001). To analyze the results, we first centered 
participants’ answers on the distributive and procedural justice scales, effect-coded the SVO 
categories, and computed two interaction terms. The first was based on the product of the 
centered procedural justice scale and the effect-coded SVO scale. The second (control term) 
was based on the product of the centered distributive justice scale and the effect-coded SVO 
scale (see Hull, Tedlie, Lehn, 1992). In our subsequent hierarchical regression analyses, we 
entered the main effect of the control variable (distributive justice) as well as the main effect 
terms (SVO and procedural justice) at Step 1. Both interaction terms were entered at Step 2
(Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003).
The hierarchical regression results are displayed in Table 5. Results indicated that Step 
1 accounted for a significant part of the variance for both OCB, ΔR2 = .17, F(3, 308) = 5.20, p 
< .01, and for satisfaction, ΔR2 = .17, F(3, 305) = 20.33, p < .001. As displayed in Table 5, 
perceived procedural justice was significantly related to OCB, and distributive justice, 
procedural justice, and SVO all exerted main effects on satisfaction. More important for the 
current purposes was that Step 2 was significant for OCB, ΔR2 = .02, F(1, 307) = 5.31, p < 
.05, and that the predicted interaction was significant (β = .17, p < .05). Simple slopes 
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analyses indicated that for proselfs, procedural justice significantly predicted OCB ( = .47, p
< .001), but for prosocials, the relation between procedural justice and OCB was 
nonsignificant ( = .13, p < .17). Step 2 was also significant for satisfaction, ΔR2 = .01, F(1, 
304) = 4.04, p < .05, revealing the predicted interaction (β = .15, p < .05). Simple slopes 
analyses revealed that the relation between procedural justice and satisfaction was stronger for 
proselfs ( = .57, p < .001) than for prosocials ( = .27, p = .01). These findings, which are 
displayed graphically in Figures 1 and 2, are in correspondence with the findings of Studies 1 
to 3.
It is noteworthy that, among participants who scored low on the procedural justice 
scale, SVO significantly predicted both OCB ( = -.19, p < .05) and satisfaction ( = -.21, p <
.05). Among participants who scored high on the procedural justice scale, SVO was unrelated 
to both OCB ( = -.15, p < .11) and satisfaction ( = -.08, p < .40). These findings further 
correspond to the general trend observed in the present studies that social value orientation 
particularly predicts responses to procedural unfairness.
Discussion
Study 4 again supported the egocentric justice hypothesis. These findings suggested 
that the processes described in this article generalize beyond experimental manipulations of 
voice versus no-voice procedures, and that similar processes can be observed both within and 
outside the psychological laboratory. Furthermore, Study 4 provided evidence that the 
described effects emerge even when we control for participants’ distributive justice concerns, 
suggesting that the relation between procedural justice and social value orientation cannot be 
accounted for by instrumental motives alone. 
General Discussion
Results of three experiments (Studies 1 to 3) and one field study (Study 4) consistently 
revealed that procedural justice effects are more pronounced among proselfs than among 
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prosocials. Evidence for this idea was found on numerous fairness-based perceptions, 
emotions, and behavioral intentions, including procedural justice judgments and satisfaction 
ratings (Studies 1, 2, and 4), relational treatment evaluations, negative procedural affect, and 
willingness to accept decisions (Study 2), negative behavioral intentions (Study 3), and 
organizational citizenship behaviors (Study 4). Furthermore, the findings replicated across 
interpersonal settings (Studies 1 and 2), a laboratory group setting (Study 3), and a 
generalized applied setting (Study 4). These findings extend scientific knowledge on 
procedural justice by specifying how people’s social value orientation may predispose people 
to respond to decision-making procedures in systematic ways. Furthermore, the current 
findings suggest that recipients’ fairness-based responses to decision-making procedures are 
substantially inspired by egocentric concerns. After all, proselfs, who are predisposed to be 
oriented towards benefiting themselves during the decision-making process, are much more 
sensitive to these procedures than prosocials, who are predisposed to rely on moral principles 
during social decision-making.
Such egocentrism in fairness-based responses is consistent with Epley and Caruso’s 
(2004) view on what they refer to as “egocentric ethics”. These authors proposed that ethical 
judgments (which are strongly related to fairness judgments; cf. Lind & Tyler, 1988) are 
much more self-serving in nature than people realize when making those judgments. The 
reason for this is, according to these authors, that people automatically interpret their
perceptions of the surrounding social world egocentrically (e.g., people directly experience 
their own perspective but must infer other’s perspectives), and in addition, people 
automatically interpret moral stimuli as positive or negative. The combination of these 
processes most likely produces judgments that are based on whether the event is positive or 
negative to the self. These propositions are in correspondence with the current findings, we 
think, given that in our studies decision-making procedures stimulated fairness-based 
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judgments particularly among individuals that are predisposed to reason egocentrically (i.e., 
proselfs). Furthermore, the current findings are consistent with both instrumental and non-
instrumental models of procedural justice. These models converge on the assumption that 
people care about fair decision-making processes because of the positive implication that fair 
procedures hold for the self, either in instrumental ways (e.g., obtaining favorable material 
outcomes) or in non-instrumental ways (e.g., gaining respect from others, establishing a 
positive sense of self-worth).
The present findings also make a novel contribution to the literature regarding social 
value orientation. This literature, which is rooted in the seminal work of Messick and 
McClintock (1968), has focused primarily on outcomes, often tangible outcomes such as 
money, points, and services (e.g., Eisenberger, Kuhlman, & Cotterell, 1992; Kuhlman & 
Marshello, 1975; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988; Parks, 1994). In fact, social value 
orientations are often conceptualized in terms of “outcome transformations,” or preferences 
that take into account the outcomes for others (Kelley et al., 2003; Van Lange, 1999; Van 
Lange, De Cremer, Van Dijk, & Van Vugt, 2007). Also, social value orientations are strongly 
related to beliefs regarding other’s cooperativeness, to response latencies for making 
decisions in outcome-relevant situations, as well as the construal of cooperative and 
noncooperative partners in terms of moral evaluations and judgments in terms of strength and 
weakness (Dehue, McClintock, & Liebrand, 1993; Liebrand et al., 1986; Sattler & Kerr, 
1991). In these contexts, differences in the weight assigned to outcomes for self and other are 
assumed to drive cognitions, affect, and behavior. Thus, previous research about social value 
orientation almost exclusively focused on social situations that involve questions about 
distributive justice. 
In the present research, we focused on social value orientation as a predictor in 
situations that involve questions about procedural justice, a justice conceptualization that is 
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empirically and theoretically distinct from distributive justice (Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Tyler 
& Lind, 1992). It is of course possible that differential responses to procedures between 
proselfs and prosocials can partly be accounted for by instrumental motives: “Using” 
procedures in such a manner as to enhance outcomes for self (proselfs), or collective 
outcomes and equality in outcomes (prosocials). Such a distinction in instrumental 
interpretations of decision-making procedures between proselfs and prosocials would be an 
innovative insight in its own right: People to some extent use procedures as proxy to make 
inferences about expected outcomes (e.g., Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Van den Bos & Lind, 
2002), and this process might be particularly pronounced for proselfs. Although this 
instrumental explanation is plausible, it is unlikely that instrumental motives alone can fully 
account for the present findings. After all, in Study 4 we empirically controlled for 
participants’ distributive justice concerns, and we still found the predicted effects. This 
suggests that proselfs are influenced by procedural justice not only for instrumental reasons 
but also for non-instrumental reasons. 
Besides instrumental motives, it is likely that proselfs (versus prosocials) regard it as 
more important that they are acknowledged and respected in procedures, which suggest 
potential differences between prosocials and proselfs in self-relevant motives such as the need 
for recognition, desire to be respected, or the need to belong. This possibility, suggested by 
the present findings, may inspire not only greater conceptual integration of various topics 
(e.g., connecting procedural justice, “the self” and cooperation and competition) but also 
intriguing new questions. For example, how do prosocials and proselfs evaluate situations 
when others – not they themselves – are granted versus denied voice? How do prosocials and 
proselfs respond to implicit or explicit threats of social exclusion (Van Beest, Van Dijk, & 
Wilke, 2003)? But the most urgent question to be addressed is why exactly are proselfs so 
sensitive to the denial of voice – or why exactly are prosocials relatively “easy” in dealing 
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with procedures in which their voices are denied? These questions suggest that the relation 
between social value orientation and procedural justice may provide a promising field of 
future research.
Qualifications of the Present Studies
Results of Studies 1 to 3 consistently revealed that proselfs responded more negatively 
to no-voice procedures than prosocials on all dependent variables. Responses to voice 
procedures were less consistent: Whereas proselfs responded more positively to voice 
procedures than prosocials on some of the dependent variables (procedural justice and 
satisfaction in Study 1, and negative procedural affect and decision acceptance in Study 2), 
prosocials and proselfs did not differ in responses to voice procedures on other dependent 
variables (procedural justice judgments, satisfaction ratings, and relational treatment 
evaluations in Study 2, and negative behavioral intentions in Study 3). This pattern was 
consistent with Study 4, in which social value orientation was particularly associated with 
responses to perceived procedural injustice. Apparently, although responses to both fair and 
unfair procedures have the potential to be influenced by social value orientation, it can be 
concluded that the influence of social value orientation on negative responses to procedural 
injustice is more robust than the influence of social value orientation on positive responses to 
procedural justice. This suggests that differential procedural justice effects as a function of 
social value orientation emerge because proselfs feel (more strongly—and perhaps more 
rapidly—than prosocials) offended by unfair procedures. Perhaps the injustice communicated 
by unfair procedures constitutes a self threat, and this self threat has more impact on 
individuals who are individually instead of socially oriented during allocation decisions. 
Moreover, it has been argued before that the negative impact of injustice on people’s fairness-
based reactions is stronger than the positive impact of justice (e.g., Folger, 1984; Folger & 
Cropanzano, 1998; Van den Bos & Van Prooijen, 2001; Van Prooijen, Van den Bos, et al., 
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2006; cf. Baumeister, Bratlavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001), and as a consequence, 
particularly responses to unfair procedures may be sensitive to personality differences.  
Importantly, we wish to emphasize here that the current findings do not imply that 
prosocials do not care about procedural justice, or that fairness-based judgments are 
completely egocentric in nature. In this regard, it is important to note that the present studies 
were limited to situations where participants themselves are the target of procedural justice or 
injustice, and that social comparison information (i.e., information about the procedures 
others are subjected to) was not available in Studies 1 to 3 of the present article. Such an 
individualistic approach is common in the vast majority of procedural justice studies, given 
that procedural justice theories seek to explain people’s responses to personal experiences of 
procedural justice or injustice (for overviews, see Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; Lind & Tyler, 
1988; Tyler & Blader, 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Furthermore, in everyday life it is likely 
that people often take their own personal experiences as point of departure when evaluating 
the fairness of decision-making procedures (cf. Epley & Caruso, 2004). This assumption is 
reflected by our finding that also in an applied setting, where participants are likely to be 
aware of the procedures that their colleagues are subjected to, proselfs are more responsive to 
procedural justice than prosocials (Study 4). Nevertheless, it is plausible that prosocials also 
attach importance to procedural justice, albeit in different ways than proselfs. For instance, 
sometimes people may be explicitly focused on procedural injustice that is imposed on others, 
and given their concern for others, prosocials may be more likely than proselfs to be attentive 
to procedural justice or injustice that targets others. Proselfs, however, are less likely to be 
influenced by whether or not other recipients receive voice or no-voice, and are likely more 
focused on whether they themselves are granted or denied voice. These ideas are clearly 
beyond the scope of the current article, but they do suggest fruitful avenues to further explore 
how social value orientation influence responses to decision-making procedures. 
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Concluding Remarks
In the present article, we have advanced two distinct models for understanding the 
strong psychological responses when people are subjected to fair versus unfair procedures. 
One of these models describes recipients’ strong reactions to voice versus no voice, and 
complementary differences in procedural justice, in terms of “prosocial” motives, such as 
social norms, values, or principles that dictate fairness and impartiality. This model, while not 
implausible, is not supported in the present research. Rather, the present research suggests that 
recipients’ fairness-based responses to decision-making procedures can be understood in 
terms of self-oriented motives, such as instrumental concerns (e.g., affecting outcomes 
through voice), or desires that can only be provided by others (e.g., respect, status, or 
belonging). One might speculate that people may often publicly respond to unfair procedures
by emphasizing violation of “unselfish” principles, moral values and the like, yet privately it 
is perhaps the violation of self-relevant concerns such as being valued and appreciated that 
matters most. As such, noting that people care about justice is one thing, understanding why 
they do is quite another challenge. Informed by our own research, we suspect that self-
relevant motives, such as strivings for both beneficial outcomes as well as respect, status, and 
belonging, are basic to understanding why unfair procedures exert negative effects on so 
many human perceptions and behaviors.  
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 Footnotes
1 In social justice literature, there is an ongoing debate on terminology of the perceived 
fairness of interpersonal treatment. Organizational justice scholars have argued that 
procedural justice should refer only to the perceived fairness of the formal decision-making 
structure, and that the perceived fairness of treatment should be referred to as interactional 
justice (e.g., Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt, 2001). Other justice scholars, however, have 
argued that treatment quality is a necessary component of procedural justice judgments, as 
people attend to both formal decision-making procedures as well as the quality of 
interpersonal treatment to evaluate procedural justice (e.g., Tyler & Blader, 2003). In the 
current article, we adopt the latter (more generalized) terminology. We believe that explicitly 
distinguishing between procedural and interactional justice makes sense only in 
organizational settings where there is a formalized decision-making structure and continuous 
interaction with authorities, enabling people to evaluate formal decision-making procedures 
separately from their interpersonal contact with authorities. In situations where people interact 
with a decision-maker only once, as in Studies 1 to 3 and as often happens in everyday life, it 
is in all likelihood much harder for recipients to view the formal decision-making process 
(e.g., being denied voice) separately from the quality of interpersonal treatment. 
2 In Study 1, the larger questionnaire in which we measured social value orientation 
also examined other (unrelated) personality factors as predictors of procedural justice effects. 
In particular, the larger questionnaire also comprised measures of participants’ structural 
approach and avoidance inclinations, and we note here that the results produced by these other 
parts of this data set were published elsewhere (Van Prooijen, Karremans, & Van Beest, 2006; 
Exp. 3). Of importance, proselfs and prosocials did not differ significantly in their structural 
approach or avoidance inclinations, which suggests that the processes described in the current 
article indeed are independent from the processes described in Van Prooijen et al., 2006.
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3 In all of the studies reported here, no different procedural justice effects were 
observed between individualists and competitors. Furthermore, when excluding the limited 
number of competitors from our samples, we found a similar influence of social value 
orientation on procedural justice effects.
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Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations of Participants’ Procedural Justice Judgments and 
Procedural Satisfaction Ratings as Function of Social Value Orientations and Procedure 
(Study 1).
           
Social Value Orientation 
  Proself     Prosocial    
Dependent variable    M SD M SD
Procedural justice judgments
Voice procedure 4.28 1.31 3.15 1.43
No-voice procedure 2.75 1.38 3.26 1.72
Procedural satisfaction ratings
Voice procedure 4.50 1.22 3.68 1.08
No-voice procedure 2.87 1.07 3.35 1.73
Note. Higher means indicate more positive judgments on the dependent variable in question.
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Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations of Various Dependent Variables as Function of Social Value 
Orientations and Procedure (Study 2).
           
Social Value Orientation 
  Proself     Prosocial    
Dependent variable    M SD M SD
Procedural justice judgments
Voice procedure 4.44 1.44 3.94 1.72
No-voice procedure 2.85 1.63 4.52 1.58
Procedural satisfaction ratings
Voice procedure 4.75 1.30 4.50 1.46
No-voice procedure 2.50 1.23 4.03 1.35
Negative procedural affect
Voice procedure 1.45 0.76 2.24 1.31
No-voice procedure 2.73 1.45 2.07 1.35
Relational treatment evaluations
Voice procedure 3.60 1.62 3.39 1.32
No-voice procedure 2.50 1.22 3.53 1.23
Decision acceptance ratings
Voice procedure 4.75 0.87 4.13 0.95
No-voice procedure 3.11 1.24 3.53 0.69
Note. Higher means indicate more positive judgments on the dependent variable in question 
(except for negative procedural affect, where higher means indicate more negative affect).
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Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations of Participants’ Negative Behavioral Intentions as Function 
of Social Value Orientations and Procedure (Study 3).
           
Social Value Orientation 
  Proself     Prosocial    
Procedure    M SD M SD
Voice 1.88 1.20 2.00 1.14
No-voice 4.17 1.67 3.04 1.50
Note. Higher means indicate more negative behavioral intentions
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Table 4
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations of Distributive Justice, Procedural 
Justice, Organizational Citizenship Behaviors (OCB), and Satisfaction (Study 4).
M SD 1 2 3 4
1. Distributive justice 2.53 1.24 -
2. Procedural justice 2.78 0.87 .64*** -
3. OCB 3.72 0.46 .09 .17** -
4. Satisfaction 1.91 0.94 .24** .37*** .36*** -
Note. N = 315. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
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Table 5
Results from Hierarchical Regression Analyses: Organizational Citizenship Behaviors (OCB) and Satisfaction as a Function of Social Value 
Orientation and Procedural Justice – Study 4.
Regression step OCB     Satisfaction   
Step 1   β t(308)   β t(305)
Distributive Justice -.10 -1.51 -.12 -1.93*
Social Value Orientation (SVO) -.05 -0.81 .11 1.99*
Procedural Justice (PJ) .25 3.70*** . -.29 -4.62***
Step 2   β t(307)   β t(304)
SVO x PJ .17 2.30* .15 2.13* .
SVO x DJ -.11 -1.53 -.05 -.74
Note. * p < .05; *** p < .001
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Figure 1. Organizational Citizenship Behavior as a Function of Social Value Orientation and 
Procedural Justice (Study 4).
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Figure 2. Satisfaction as a Function of Social Value Orientation and Procedural Justice (Study 
4).
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